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ABSTRACT:  
This paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of military competition between states on 
the size and composition of the economy and the government. Great economies of scale in 
warfare and even distributions of military capability among the contestants generate intense 
interstate rivalry, strong concern for relative economic and military capability. Consequently, 
there is a larger economy and government and an increasing share of the military in the economy. 
However, if there are diseconomies of scale in the provision of public intermediate inputs, 
intense military competition between states actually increases the relative size of the civilian 
public sector relative to that of the military. The paper then studies how waves of military 
technological revolutions affected military competition between states and the size and 
composition of economy and government in history. 
 
Key Words: Growth of Government, Public Intermediate Inputs, Civilianization, Economic 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper uses a formal model to analyze the relationship between international military 
competition and the size and composition of the economy and government. The model builds on 
the current anarchy and conflicts literature. Anarchy is the fragmented political order where there 
are at least two contestants to resources and they may use brute force to settle the contest. In 
other words, anarchy is a lack of property rights regime, as argued in Bush (1974), Hirshleifer 
(1988, 1989, 1991, 1995), Tullock (1971, 1972, 1974, 1980), Grossman (2001, 2002), Grossman 
and Kim (1995) and Alesina and Spolaore (2005). The model follows the formulation of 
Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 1991, 1995) that the ratio of military capability between the contestants 
decides the probability of victory between them or their respective share of contested resources 
captured and secured. The resources contested could either be land, maritime territory, 
population or accessibility to sea lanes. States go to war or military contest short of war or 
pursue diplomatic bargaining in the shadow of war for such resources, even when survival is not 
at stake. The winner secures a larger share of the contested resources and, in the extreme case, 
the winner takes all. The model adds to the current anarchy and conflict literature by modeling 
the effect of international military competition on the size and composition of the economy and 
government. 
 
The argument that international military competition leads to better economic performance is 
named the Hume-Kant hypothesis. The Hume-Kant hypothesis argues that international military 
competition between states and political authorities, such as that exists within the European 
competitive state system, leads to innovations and superior economic growth, according to 
Bernholz and Vaubel eds. (2004, p. 1-17). This is the X-efficiency of microeconomics at the 
grandest level. Among the many prominent adherents of the Hume-Kant Hypothesis are Smith 
(1776, Vol. 2, 253), Gibbon (1787, Vol. VI, Chapter 38: 328), Weber (1923, p. 249), Wesson 
(1967, 1978), Baechler (1975), Jones (1974, 1981, 1988, 1990), Kennedy (1987), North (1995, 
1998), Weiss and Hobson (1995), Bernholz, Streit and Vaubel eds. (1998) and Bernholz and 
Vaubel eds. (2004). North (1995, p. 26) comments: “……Even the relative failures in western 
Europe played an essential role in European development and were more successful than China 
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or Islam because of competitive pressures.” This paper adds to the above literature by a formal 
model that analyzes the effects of international military competition on the size and composition 
of the economic and government. 
 
An important feature of modern economy is rise of the service state originated in Europe. The 
modern service state intervenes intensively and extensively in the economy and provides myriad 
public intermediate inputs to boost productivity. There was a rising share of the public sector in 
the economy as per capita income increased. This is the Wagner’s Law in public finance studied 
in Bird (1971), Webber and Wildavsky (1986), Breton (1989) and West (1991). Furthermore, 
non military public expenditures grew faster than military expenditures during the rise of Europe 
even though military expenditures were ballooning and warfare was conducted on a larger and 
larger scale. The result was the civilianization of the European states despite the intense 
international military competition. This is termed the civilianization paradox of war making and 
state making by Tilly (1992, p. 122-124). Tilly (1992, p. 122) puts it this way: “The 
state-transforming processes we have surveyed produced a surprising result: civilianization of 
government. The result is surprising because the expansion of military force drove the processes 
of state formation.” This paper contributes further insights to the above literature by analyzing 
how changes in the economies of scale in the application of force could lead to changes in the 
size and composition of the economy and government.  
 
2. THE MODEL. 
 
There are two unitary states. In period zero, nature decides the respective endowment and 
military and economic-fiscal efficiency of the states, the utility functions of the states, the 
conflict technology and the production technology. In period one, the states allocate the 
endowment between direct consumption and input into production. From the output of 
production, the states allocate between consumption and military expenditures. In period two, 
the military spending of the states decide their probability of winning the military contest 
between them. 
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The utility functions of State 1 and State 2 are separable and composed of three parts: 
π α β γ1 1 1= + +P C Lln ln          (1) 
( )π α β γ2 2 21= − + +P C Lln ln         (2) 
γ ln Li  is the direct consumption component of the utility function. It is derived from consuming 
the endowed resources directly and Li  is the level of the endowed resources directly consumed. 
β lnCi  is the indirect consumption component of the utility function for consuming the 
production of the economy and Ci  is the amount of production consumed. αP  and ( )α 1− P  
are the security component of the utility function. P  is the probability of victory by State 1 in a 
military conflict or contest short of war between State 1 and 2. α  is the stake of the military 
contest.  
 
The probability of victory by State 1 in a military conflict or contest short of war between State 1 
and 2 is 
( )
( ) ( )P
q F
q F q F
m
m m=
+
1 1
1 1 2 2
         (3) 
This is the Tullock-Hirshleifer ratio form of conflict technology function or power function. P  
is the probability that State 1 will emerge triumphant in a military confrontation with State 2. 
Alternatively, P   means the share of the prize of the conflict that State 1 will capture in a 
military contest with State 2. F1  is the level of military expenditures of State 1 and F2  is the 
level of military expenditures of State 2. q1  is the efficiency of State 1 in turning military 
expenditures into effective military capability and q2  is the efficiency of State 2 in turning 
military expenditures into effective military capability. Therefore, q F1 1  is the military 
capability of State 1 and q F2 2  is the military capability of State 2. m  is the mass factor. m  
measures the returns to scale in conflicts. A larger mass factor enhances the relative advantage of 
the bigger contestant. If a larger force can more easily overwhelm a smaller force, for instance, 
when there is offensive advantage, then m  is larger.  
 
The budget constraints facing State 1 and 2 are: 
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L I Ei i i+ =            (4) 
( )C F Y Ii i i i+ =            (5) 
I1  is the level of production inputs supplied by State 1. ( )Y I1 1  is the production level resulted 
from such provisions of inputs by the state. State contributes to production through the 
provisions of public intermediate inputs. Public intermediate inputs include physical 
infrastructures such as roads, light houses, street lights as well as services and intangible public 
goods provided by the state such as enforcement of law and order, the creation and maintenance 
of a sound monetary and financial system, the organization and sponsorship of overseas 
expeditions for commercial purposes as well as efforts to aid educational, scientific and 
technological advances. Public intermediate inputs raise the productivity of the economy. 
 
Production function is: 
( )Y I A Ii i i i h=            (6) 
h  is scale factor. A1  is the economic-fiscal efficiency of State 1 and A2  is the 
economic-fiscal efficiency of State 2. We assume 0 1 2 1 2< < ∞m h q q A A, , , , , , , ,α β γ .  
 
Substituting the constraints into the objective functions we have: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ln ln,F I
m
m m
hq F
q F q F
A I F E I
1 1
1
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1π α β γ=
+
+ − + −     (7) 
The first order conditions are: 
( )∂π∂ α
β1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 0
F
mP P F
A I Fh
= − −
−
=
−        (8) 
∂π
∂
β γ1
1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
0
I
A hI
A I F E I
h
h=
−
−
−
=
−
        (9) 
 
Similarly State 2 solves 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ln ln,F I
m
m m
hq F
q F q F
A I F E I
2 2
2
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2π α β γ=
+
+ − + −     (10) 
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The first order conditions are: 
( )∂π∂ α
β2
2
2
1
2 2 2
1 0
F
mP P F
A I Fh
= − −
−
=
−        (11) 
∂π
∂
β γ2
2
2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2
0
I
A hI
A I F E I
h
h=
−
−
−
=
−
        (12) 
 
Using the first order conditions, we have       
F
F
Y
Y
A
A
I
I
A
A
E
E
h h
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
= =
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟         (13) 
R q
q
A
A
E
E
h
≡
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1
2
1
2
1
2
          (14) 
R  is the ratio of military capability between the two states. The probability of victory by State 1 
in a military contest with State 2 is therefore 
P R
R
q
q
A
A
E
E
q
q
A
A
E
E
m
m
m mh
m mh= +
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
        (15) 
 
3. COMPARATIVE STATICS. 
 
Without loss of generality we focus our analysis on State 1. From previous results, we have 
( )
( )( )I
h R h mR
h R h mR
E
m m
m m1
2
2 1
1
1
=
+ +
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
β α
γ β α
       (16) 
( )
( )
( )( )F A E
mR
R mR
h R h mR
h R h mR
h
m
m m
m m
m m
h
1 1 1 2
2
2
1
1
1
=
+ +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
+ +
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
α
β α
β α
γ β α
    (17) 
 
Proposition 1: 
States care about relative economic and military strength and differences in growth rates of 
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military efficiency, economic efficiency and size of controlled resources. 
Proof: 
Using the Envelope theorem, the first order conditions, and ∂∂
R
q
Rq
2
2
1
= −
− , ∂∂
R
A
RA
2
2
1
= −
− , 
∂
∂
R
E
RE
2
2
1
= −
− , ∂∂
R
q
Rq
1
1
1
= −
− , and that in equilibrium, P R
R
m
m= + 1
, we have 
d P
R
F
Y
I
E
dq
q
dq
q
Y
F
dA
A
dA
A
dA
A
h Y
F
E
I
Y
F
E
I
dE
E
dE
E
dE
E
π α
∂
∂1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1 1 1 1
=
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
 (18) 
Q.E.D. 
 
International military competition is not merely a contest of military valor and equipment. It is 
also a test of fiscal strength and economic might. There arises the concern for relative economic 
capability and efficiency.1 
 
Proposition 2: 
The provision of public intermediate inputs, the size of production, the size of the military, the 
share of the military in production and the concern for relative economic and military strength 
(in terms of growth rates) are at their maximum when the rivals are equal in military capability. 
Proof: 
( )
( )( )( )
∂
∂
γα
γ β α
I
E
R
hm R R
h R h mR
m m
m m
1
1
2 1 2
2 2
1
1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
−
+ + +
−
       (19) 
( )
( )( )
∂
∂
α β
β α
F
Y
R
m R R
R mR
m m
m m
1
1
2 1 2
2 2
1
1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
−
+ +
−
        (20) 
                                                 
1 Refer to Grieco (1988a, 1988b, 1990), Baldwin (1993), Gowa (1989, 1994) and Gowa and Mansfield (1993). 
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∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
F
R
Y
F
Y
R
F
Y
Y
R
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟          (21) 
From equation 18 and note that 
∂
∂
∂
∂
Y
F
R
F
Y
F
Y
R
1
1 1
1
2
1
1
1−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟−
          (22) 
and 
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
Y
F
E
I
R
F
Y
I
E
I
E
F
Y
R
F
Y
I
E
R
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
−
     (23) 
The above are positive for R < 1, zero for R = 1, and negative for R > 1. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Only among equals are there real contests. If the difference in capability is too great, then there 
will not be any real contest and anarchy itself might give way to hierarchy, as analyzed in 
Hirshleifer (1995). The more closely matched the two rivals are, the greater the concern for 
relative economic and military strength. When rivals are equally matched, the incentive to outdo 
each other is at its greatest. States in the state system are therefore keenly aware of the strategic 
importance of the relative capabilities of the constituent units. For instance, the concept of 
balance of power invariably entered the mind of statesmen in the ancient Greek city state system, 
the medieval Italian city state system and the modern European state system.2 
 
Proposition 3: 
An increase in the mass factor results in a higher (lower) level of public intermediate input, a 
larger (smaller) share of the military in the economy, and a larger (smaller) economy & greater 
(smaller) concern for relative economic and military strength when rivals are about equal 
                                                 
2 The Peloponnesian War (B.C. 431 to B.C. 404) was caused by the wary that Greek city states had about the 
ascendancy of Athenian power. Refer to Thucydides, Blanco and Roberts (1998). 
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(greatly unequal) in military capability. 
Proof: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )( )
∂
∂
γα
γ β α
I
E
m
hR R m R R
h R h mR
m m m
m m
1
1
2 2
2 2
1 1
1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
+ + −
+ + +
ln
      (24) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )
∂
∂
αβ
β α
F
Y
m
R R m R R
R mR
m m m
m m
1
1
2 2
2 2
1 1
1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
+ + −
+ +
ln
      (25) 
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
F
m
F
Y
Y
m
Y
F
Y
m
F
Y
Y
m
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟        (26) 
From equation 18 and note that 
∂
∂
∂
∂
Y
F
m
F
Y
F
Y
m
1
1 1
1
2
1
1
1−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟−
          (27) 
and  
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
Y
F
E
I
m
F
Y
I
E
I
E
F
Y
m
F
Y
I
E
m
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥
−
     (28) 
The above are negative for R  close to zero or very large and positive for R  close to one.  
Q.E.D.  
 
An increase in the economies of scale in conflict has two effects on the marginal effect of 
relative military capability on probability of victory. One is the scaling effect and the other is the 
unbalancing effect.  
( )
( )
( )
∂
∂ ∂
2 1
2
1
3
1
1
1
P
R m
R
R
mR R
R
R
m
m
m m
m
=
+
+
−
+
−
−
ln        (29) 
In equation 29, the first term on the right-hand side is the scaling effect and the second term is 
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the unbalancing effect. By the scaling effect, given an increase in mass factor both players try to 
increase their fighting forces as size confers greater advantage. By the unbalancing effect, the 
bigger player becomes more powerful and the weaker player weaker given the greater economies 
of scale in conflict. The unbalancing effect makes both players put in less effort in fighting. The 
greater the asymmetry in capability, the greater the unbalancing effect. The unbalancing effect is 
zero if the two rivals have equal capability. Therefore, if there is a rough balance (great disparity) 
in the relative capability of the contestants, then an increase in economies of scale in conflict 
increases (reduces) the concern for relative capability since the scaling effect dominates (is 
dominated by) the unbalancing effect. That is, the total effect is negative for R  close to zero or 
very large and positive for R  close to one. 
 
Not all state systems exhibit the same level of concern for relative economic and military 
strength nor all empires are equally entrenched and complacent. For state systems with very low 
mass factor such as the pre modern Southeast Asia due to difficult terrains and vast distance 
separating states, there was a low level of concern for relative military and economic capability. 
For empires facing a low mass factor such as the medieval empires of Tang China and Umayyad 
Caliphate, there would be greater concern for relative military and economic capability than 
empires facing a high mass factor such as the universal empires of the late classical era or the 
continental size gunpowder empires of the modern era. 
 
Proposition 4: 
When public intermediate input has decreasing returns to scale in the production function and 
the two rivals are about equal (very unequal) in military capability, an increase in the mass 
factor cause the public sector to become larger (smaller).  
Proof: 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )( )
∂
∂
β α
γ β α
γα
γ β α
I
Y
m
A E h
h R h mR
h R h mR
hR R m R R
h R h mR
h
m m
m m
h m m m
m m
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2 2
2 2
1
1
1
1 1
1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −
+ +
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
+ + −
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥
− −
−
ln
 
            (30) 
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If h < 1 and ( ) ( )[ ]R m R Rm m+ + − >1 1 02 2 ln  (<0), then ∂ ∂
I
Y
m
1
1 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
>  (<0). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Greater economies of scale in conflicts lead to larger scale of warfare in a state system and 
thereby generate higher demand for revenue to support the military. As a response, the state puts 
in more efforts to boost the productivity of the economy. If public intermediate inputs has 
decreasing returns to scale in the production function, then the increase in production is slower 
than the increase in public intermediate input. There arises the famous Wagner’s Law in public 
finance: the rising share of the public sector in the economy that accompanies the increase in per 
capita income. On the other hand, in an imperial order, an increase in the economies of scale in 
conflicts dampens military contests between the empire and marginal states at the fringe. The 
empire becomes more secure and complacent. Consequently, the empire puts in less effort in 
supporting the functioning of the economy. If public intermediate inputs has decreasing returns 
to scale in the production function, then the decrease in production is slower than the decrease in 
public intermediate input, and there is a declining share of the public sector in the economy. This 
explains the lethargic gunpowder empires that provided little services to the economy as 
observed by Jones (1981, 1988, 1990). 
 
In a state system, if the increase in the economies of scale in conflicts goes far enough, then 
ultimately there will be the civilianization paradox of war making and state making: the 
expansions of the scale of warfare and the military produce the surprising result of the 
civilianization of government. 
 
 
Proposition 5: 
When the two rivals are about equal in military capability and there are decreasing returns to 
scale in the provision of public intermediate inputs, if the mass factor is sufficiently large then an 
increase in the mass factor causes a declining share of the military in the public sector.  
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Proof: 
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
∂
∂
β α
γ β α
α
β α
β γα
γ β α
F
I
m
AE
h R h mR
h R h mR
R
R mR
h mh R
h R h mR
R m R R
h
m m
m m
h
m
m m
m
m m
m m
1
1 1
2
2
1
2 2
2
2
2 2
1
1 1
1
1
1 1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
+ +
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
+ +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥⎥
× + −
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥ + + −
−
−
ln
  (31) 
For R  close to one, ( ) ( )[ ]R m R Rm m+ + − >1 1 02 2 ln  and an increase in m  results in a larger 
( )( )
mh R
h R h mR
m
m m
2
2
1
γα
γ β α+ + +
. Given that ( )h − <1 0 , if m  is large enough such 
that ( )( )( )β
γα
γ β α
+
−
+ + +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥ <
m h h R
h R h mR
m
m m
1
1
0
2
2 , then
∂
∂
F
I
m
1
1 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
< . 
Q.E.D. 
 
To support a larger military given the larger scale of warfare, the state requires a larger economy. 
Yet, there are diseconomies of scale in the provisions of public intermediate inputs. 
Consequently, the size of the civilian public sector has to be drastically increased and there arose 
the civilianization paradox. 
 
5. CASE STUDIES FROM WORLD HISOTRY 
 
I. Ancient Middle Eastern Leadership. 
 
Unlike the open and fragmented Greater Mesopotamia, the enclosed and isolated Nile valley was 
conducive to the consolidation of an empire. Consequently, Mesopotamia retained her state 
system for further six centuries after the establishment of the Egyptian Empire. Besides, the 
series of empires in Greater Mesopotamia from the twenty fourth century BC onwards facilitated 
by the use of bronze weapons were never as secure as the Egyptian Empire which was over 
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1,300 years old before she suffered her first major invasion. The effects of such differences on 
innovations and development were rather obvious: the so-called ancient Middle Eastern 
leadership in the early phase of human civilized history, from c. a. B. C. 3500 to c. a. B. C. 1000, 
as studied in Stavrianos (1982). 
 
The Middle Eastern leadership was manifested in many ways. The region invented the first 
writing system, the Cuneiform, as well as the alphabetical writing. It produced the earliest law 
codes and much literature of high value, such as the Code of Hammurabi. Other evidence of the 
better economic performance of Mesopotamia include city planning, the first irrigation system in 
the world to redirect mountain spring water and the constant improvements in technology. It 
developed advanced metallurgy techniques for working with bronze, lead, silver, gold and iron. 
All these achievements showed the interests of the Mesopotamian states in furthering economic 
development and an increased role of civil bureaucracy in the economy and the state.  
 
Cultural and scientific achievements were great as well. A great part mathematical and 
astronomical science owed its beginnings to the Mesopotamians. An example was the 
sexagesimal system which was used for all types of calculations and is still used for the clock in 
all around the world. Mesopotamia invented the wheel. The manufacture of glass was a major 
technological breakthrough. Other technological advances included glazed pottery and bricks. 
Assyrian knowledge of the planets of our solar system led to accurate predictions of solar and 
lunar eclipses, as documented by Haywood (1997, p. 44-45).  
 
II. Classical Pluralism. 
 
The use of horse drawn war chariots and iron weapons changed the geopolitical landscape of the 
ancient world. From around 700 to 300 BC, the Neo-Assyrian Empire, the Neo-Babylonian 
Empire and the Achaemenid Persian Empire ruled over the whole Middle East. The weight of 
the empires stalled the developmental momentum in the old seats of early civilizations. Economy 
of the region slowly declined. In sharp contrast to the bursts of innovations of the earlier era, the 
Middle East could boast of no major advances during this era. In contrast, the Chinese, Indian 
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and Greek civilizations were city state systems or territorial state systems. The dynamism of 
these state systems produced the splendid classical achievements of the Chinese, Greek (and 
Hellenistic) and Indian civilizations. Their representatives were Confucius, Socrates and Buddha. 
Consequently, the ancient Near Eastern leadership ended and world history entered the pluralism 
of classical period. 
 
During this era, land warfare of the largest scale was seen in China. The rise of heavy infantry 
led to more frequent and larger scale warfare in China from the Spring and Autumn Era to the 
Era of Contending States. It was common for warring states to mobilize hundreds of thousands 
of soldiers or even close to a million troops and fight over extensive spaces for years. This could 
not be done without a very high degree of fiscal strength and economic achievements. There was 
a growth of government and civilian control of the military was established: an ancient example 
of the civilization paradox of war making and state making, as studied in Hui (2005). 
 
III. Indian Classical Golden Age.  
 
The invention and use of iron in military increased competition in the state systems of the 
classical world and ultimately transformed them into gigantic universal empires. The 
Mediterranean world came under the Roman Empire. In China, the Chin and Han dynasty 
reigned supreme. In Persia, it was the Parthian then the Sasanian Empire. Military capability and 
economic-fiscal might between these empires and the outside groups were of vast distances. 
Great asymmetry in capability dampened competition and resulted in stagnation and decline. The 
vigor and splendors of the preceding state systems soon disappeared. There was a retrenchment 
of government too. The Han Dynasty of China, for instance, practiced the Taoist minimalist 
approach to government and the Confucian small government policy. 
 
The exception was India. Given the fragmented geography of India, the powerful and gigantic 
Mauryan Empire lasted only about a century and a half. Then it was a fragmented and 
competitive state system in India, from around BC 200 to AD 300. Then the Gupta Empire came. 
The Gupta Empire, largely confined to Northern India and more decentralized than the Mauryan 
  
16
Empire, ruled from 320 AD to 720 AD, with effective rule from 320 AD to around 500 AD. It 
was constantly challenged by Southern Indian states and the nomads from the Northwest, as 
studied in Stavrianos (1982, p. 134-137). During this period, the Indian civilization was 
propelled to the pinnacle of its classical golden age. Sanskrit learning was revived to serve as a 
lingua franca. Sanskrit literature flourished. States took strong interests in development. Hindu 
laws were codified, producing the authoritative Hindu Law Books (dharmashastra), the foremost 
of them being the Code of Manu. In art, after a long period of Hellenistic influence, there 
emerged an indigenous Indian style. The decimal place system of numerical notation, one of the 
great inventions of the human mind, emerged in India by A.D. 270. There was a flourishing 
international trade, to the West, Southeast Asia and China. Indian culture spread abroad, 
especially to Southeast Asia. A greater India emerged. Buddhism, with its accompanying art 
forms, flowed like a mighty torrent into China, Korea and Japan and Central Asia.  
 
IV. Abbasid Golden Age and Sung Puzzle. 
 
Around A.D. 200-500, there was a decline in the economies of scale in warfare due to the rise of 
cavalry. The classical empires retreated or dissolved. Nomadic hordes advanced at the expense 
of the settled societies, as documented in Dudley (1990, 1991, 1992), Keegan (1993) and 
McNeill (1982). During the medieval era, political fragmentation was the norm in Europe, 
Middle East, India and China. Myriads smaller kingdoms and short-life empires came and went. 
 
The Islamic world under the Abbasid Caliphate (A.D. 750 to A.D. 1258) operated under a state 
system. The greatest Islamic achievements were the products of this era: the Abbasid Golden 
Age.3 This period experienced the Arab agricultural revolution with the widespread diffusion of 
new crops and the promotion of new or the rehabilitation of old irrigation systems, as studied in 
Watson (1974). Trade was thriving and Arabian traders were at the center of the global trading 
network, according to Abu-Lughod (1989). Islamic merchants pioneered many innovations in 
business organization and finance, including the double entry book keeping, the pooling of 
                                                 
3 Refer to Wesson (1978, p. 93-95), Armstrong (2000, p. 45-81) and Sonn (2004, chapter 2) and Bernholz (2004, p. 
184 to 193) in Bernholze and Vaubel ed. (2004). 
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capital through partnerships and the use of letters of credit and promissory notes that facilitated 
long distance trade. There were great literary achievements and science and mathematics 
advanced to a very high level.  
 
Political fragmentation was the norm in China in the millennium after the collapse of Han 
Dynasty. During this period, there was more creativity in commercial, cultural, technological and 
institutional arenas. These developments culminated during the Sung era. During the Sung era, 
there was sustained growth in per capita income for four centuries. The economy prospered with 
elaborate internal and external trading networks. Sung China was the industrial center of the 
global trading system and the most advanced economy. There were many innovations in 
production technology including the water-powered hemp-spinning machine, the movable 
printing press and the compass, as documented in Graham (1973), Cipolla (1967, 101-2) and 
Elvin (1973). According to Harrison (1972, p. 290), the total Chinese output of iron at the close 
of the eleventh century A.D. was approximately the same as the entire production of Europe in 
1700. The porcelains manufactured during the Sung dynasty were the best in quality and design. 
Cultural achievements were equally great. The most important works of Neo-Confucianism were 
done in the Sung dynasty. Poetry and other literary works also flourished. Such miraculous 
performance was not repeated in the powerful and unified Ming and Ching periods, as studied in 
Jones (1981, p. 202). The achievements were therefore termed the Sung puzzle. 
 
Sung era China was a tri-polar state system. During Sung era, large scale warfare was the rule. 
The scale of the militaries was greater than that in Europe before the Napoleonic wars. Sung 
China maintained a large military-industry complex to tap technological prowess for the military. 
The state intervened extensively in the economy to boost productivity and raise revenue for 
supporting the gigantic military-industry complex. Consequently, Sung China manifested the 
civilianization paradox: the large scale warfare stimulated the growth of the bureaucracy which 
overshadowed and overpowered the military. 
 
V. European Miracle.  
 
  
18
The gunpowder military revolution increased the economies of scale in warfare and brought 
forth lasting continental size empires. This process began around A.D. 1200 and gathered 
momentum especially around A.D. 1400. In China, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty reigned from A. 
D. 1279 to A. D. 1368 and was succeeded by the Chinese Ming dynasty which reigned from A. 
D. 1368 to A. D. 1644. Then the Manchurian Ching dynasty ruled from A. D. 1644 to A. D. 
1911. In India, the gun powder empires were the Sultanate of Delhi and the Mughul Empire (A. 
D. 1526 to 1858). The Ottoman Turks established the gun powder Ottoman Empire in Middle 
East and Southeastern Europe in A. D. 1350. There was a series of gunpowder imperial regimes 
centered on Persia, including the Ikhanate, the Timurid Empire and the Saffavid Empire. In 
Japan, there was the Tokugawa Shogunate.  
 
A similarity between these gunpowder empires was that they controlled an extensive territory or 
sphere of influence and had practically nothing to fear. They were complacent, lethargic states or 
revenue pumps, as noted by Jones (1981, 1988). They offered very few overhead services 
necessary for the proper functioning of the economy and society. They governments were too 
small to be able to penetrate and mobilize the society for state purposes as well as simply too 
inefficient and corrupted. They were in general isolationist and anti commerce or did not put 
much emphasis on commerce or economic development. Consequently, the developmental 
momentum of the medieval era on these diverse lands died out. In fact, before the arrival of the 
Europeans, these gunpowder empires were entering into some kind of a synchronized decline. 
Asian trade was in general shrinking, according to Simkin (1968, p. 258-9) and Jones (1981, p. 
170). 
 
Of the major civilizations, only the geographically fragmented Europe escaped the fate of the 
gunpowder empires. The gunpowder military revolution caused petty feudal estates and 
principalities to be consolidated into national states which continuously engaged each other in 
large scale warfare or other forms of interstate rivalry. The perpetual and intense interstate power 
struggles produced positive effects on the development of Europe, economic, political, social 
and cultural. According to North (1995, p. 13-17; 1998, p. 16-19), military technological 
changes since late medieval era that raised the scale of warfare in Europe led to greater revenue 
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demand on the state and pushed the state to provide more public intermediate inputs and better 
institutions including property rights regime. The absolutist states formulated forward-looking 
policies. Statesmen and scholars produced mercantilism for guiding public policy. Private 
individuals published exhortations to purposeful development. The English measured themselves 
by their successful Dutch cousins. France in turn was driven by her rivalry with England to 
promote manufacturing. The rivalry with Prussia led Austria to reform her laws and public 
administration. Russia under Peter the Great forcefully westernized and modernized to join the 
rank of the great powers. The interstate rivalry caused the European states to outdo each other in 
almost all fields of human endeavors: overseas explorations, manufacturing, scientific enquiries, 
technological innovations as well as improvements in laws, public administrations and the 
overall institutions of the state. In their effort to outdo each other, the European states produced 
the great cultural, economic, political and social achievements that we called industrialization 
and modernization. 
 
The two key features of a modern society, the modern service state and the civilian control of the 
military were the results of this intense interstate rivalry. To support the massive military 
establishments ushered in by the gunpowder military revolution, states in Europe greatly 
expanded their services to the economy to boost productivity and raise revenue. This resulted in 
the well-known Wagner's law in public finance of a rise share of public sector in the economy as 
per capita income increases, a topic studied in Bird (1971). In fact, the expansion of the service 
state stimulated by the increasing scale in warfare went so far in Europe that it led to the 
civilianization paradox of war making and state making observed by Tilly (1992): the greater 
scale of warfare actually resulted in a smaller share of the military in the public sector in terms of 
both budget size and number of personnel and the civilian control of the military. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
The model demonstrates the effects of military technology and international military competition 
on the size and composition of the economy and government. Case studies from world history 
affirm the insights generated by the model. Therefore there should be more research on this 
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topic.  
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